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SUMMARY
This article addresses the rise of design thinking and its problematics in the social policy sphere. In particular, it argues that
studies of social policy design, like all design work in policymaking, must differentiate more carefully between technical and
political considerations in public policymaking and examine the implications each process has for the content of social policy
design, its implementation, and its prospects of success or failure. The article develops a model of social policy formulation
spaces based on the extent to which policies are intended to address technical or political problems and a government’s capacity
to engage in policy analysis and alternative assessment. This model is applied in the articles in this special issue to help
understand the patterns of policy content and outcome success and failure found in this sector across multiple jurisdictions
and issue areas. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION: THE (MISSING) EMPIRICS OF SOCIAL POLICY DESIGN
Social policies are the result of efforts made by governments to alter aspects of their own or public behavior in
order to carry out some end or purpose they consider important. Perhaps a gaping hole in social policymaking is
the lack of attention given to “global pragmatics and future problematics” (Angelides and Caiden, 1994). These
refer to changing current realities, emerging trends, complexities, and future uncertainties in the policy sphere.
In recent years, social policymaking has rapidly evolved and is no longer restricted to achieving singular purposes
such as social protection, provision of health and education, or increasing civil society engagement. It is increas-
ingly integrated and engages multiple levels of public administration and spans across multiple sectors. It is also
dynamic and context speciﬁc in that it comprises complex arrangements of social goals and policy means that have
arisen at different points in time and in different locations through processes of policy formulation unique to each
jurisdiction and government (Howlett and Cashore, 2009). Policymakers therefore need to take a fundamentally
different approach to policy formulation—one that consciously “designs” social policies to balance practical and
political challenges (which may pull policy means in opposite directions) while continuously evolving over time
and adapting to different contexts. In designing successful social policies, it is also imperative to enhance policy
capacity so as to avoid short-sighted and one-dimensional policies (Angelides and Caiden, 1994). The need for
balanced social policy backed by necessary capacity is of signiﬁcance in both developed and developing countries,
where social policy challenges are many and the resources available to meet them scarce.
In the policy sciences, concepts of policy “design” have been linked to the study of both the policy instruments
used to implement policy and the formulation of programs and packages of such tools intended to address social
and political problems (May, 2003; Howlett, 2014). In their many works on the subject in the late 1980s and early
1990s, Linder and Peters (1988) argued that the actual process of public policy decision-making could, in an
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analytical sense, be divorced from the abstract concept of policy design, in the same way that an abstract architec-
tural concept can be divorced from its engineering manifestation in theory, if not in practice.
Such a distinction, they argued, allowed policy designs to be separated conceptually from policy designing and
allowed the development within policy studies of a design orientation (Schön, 1988, 1992). In this view, policy
design involves the effort to more or less systematically develop efﬁcient and effective policies through the appli-
cation of knowledge about policy means gained from experience and reason, to the development and adoption of
courses of action that are likely to succeed in attaining their desired goals or aims within speciﬁc policy contexts
(Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Bobrow, 2006; Montpetit, 2003). But exactly what constitutes a design, what makes
one successful, what makes one design better than another, and how do design processes differ from other formu-
lation techniques and activities? These are important questions, and attempts to answer them have animated design
studies in the policy sciences over the past half century.
Studies of policy formulation, in particular, have addressed the impact of policy ideas and advice on alternative
speciﬁcation and policy creation and have distinguished between design processes that are largely “technical” or
problem oriented and those that are more “partisan” or politically oriented (Linder and Peters, 1990a; Craft and
Howlett, 2012). Several processes of policy formulation have been uncovered in these studies, ranging from
bargaining to partisan electoral maneuvering. “Design” is usually thought to exist at one end of a spectrum ranging
from contingent “non-design” to more precise instrumental efforts to match problems and solutions (Howlett and
Mukherjee, 2014).
Policy design, in this sense, is a speciﬁc form of policy formulation based on the gathering of knowledge about
the effects of policy tool use on policy targets and the application of that knowledge to the development and
implementation of policies aimed at the attainment of desired policy objectives (Bobrow, 2006; Bobrow and
Dryzek, 1987; Montpetit, 2003; Weaver, 2009, 2010). It involves the deliberate and conscious attempt to deﬁne
policy goals and connect them in an instrumental fashion to tools expected to realize those objectives (Gilabert
and Lawford-Smith, 2012; Majone, 1975; May, 2003). Each of the three main alternative formulation processes
is discussed later.
Problem-centered policy design consists of considering alternative arrangements deemed potentially capable of
resolving or addressing some aspect of a policy problem, one or more of which is ultimately put into practice.
Much existing work on policy design adopts this orientation uncritically and advocates or desires policymaking
to take on this complexion (Tribe, 1972). Such a problem-centered policymaking process is, of course, only one
possible orientation or set of practices that can be followed in actual policy formulation (Colebatch, 1998; Tribe,
1972). Policy formulators may base their analyses on logic, knowledge, and experience but also upon purely
political calculations that can also serve to generate alternatives (Bendor et al., 2009; Sidney, 2007). Indeed,
politically centered policy design is a staple of policymaking in democracies and non-democracies alike. Although
such situations are well known in political science, they have not been well studied in the policy sciences, and the
extent to which considerations such as political gain or blame avoidance calculations outweigh instrumental factors
in policy formulation is a key empirical question (Hood, 2010) that studies of social policymaking such as those
presented in this special issue help to illuminate.
Policy design, understood in this broad sense, overlaps and straddles policy formulation, decision-making, and
policy implementation and involves actors, ideas, and interests active at each stage of the policy process (Howlett
et al., 2009). However, it also posits a very speciﬁc form of interaction among these elements, driven by knowledge
and evidence of the potential and limitations of alternatives in achieving policy and political goals.
Both the aforementioned kinds of design processes can be performed either well or poorly. Why this is the case
and the factors that lead to one outcome rather than another are addressed later. Both, however, are quite different
from a third formulation process—non-design—which refers to policymaking bereft of either a problem or politi-
cally centered instrumental design logic. That is, while many policies contain some instrumental intention or result
from some effort to consciously match means and goals in a design process, in other circumstances, policy
decisions will be more highly contingent and “irrational”, that is, driven by situational logics and opportunism
rather than careful deliberation and assessment (Cohen et al., 1979; Dryzek, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Eijlander,
2005; Franchino and Hoyland, 2009).
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This occurs when policymakers are unable to understand a problem and specify its root causes or when they
take decisions and assess alternatives based on random or highly contingent processes that can involve
activities such as bargaining or horse trading, which fail to approximate the “search” strategies behind more
instrumental problem and politically related policy activity (Lindblom, 1955; Cohen et al., 1972, 1979). In such
formulation and decision processes, design considerations may be more or less absent, and the quality of the
logical or empirical relations between policy components as solutions to problems may be incorrect or ignored
(Cohen et al., 1979; Dryzek, 1983; Eijlander, 2005; Franchino and Hoyland, 2009; Kingdon, 1984; Sager and
Rielle, 2013).
While this is clear enough conceptually, very little is actually known about the empirics of many important
aspects of formulation work in public policymaking, including who is engaged in policy design and non-design
efforts and why one process would emerge rather than another (deLeon, 1992; Sidney, 2007; Schneider and
Sidney, 2009). This is especially the case concerning the nature of the kinds of the “design” activities that go into
policy formulation and implementation as well as how common such efforts are compared with the pursuit of less
instrumental kinds of policy formulation processes.
This high level of contingency found in some decision-making contexts has led some critics and observers of
policy design efforts to suggest that policies cannot be “designed” in the sense that a house or a piece of furniture
can be (Dryzek and Ripley, 1988; deLeon, 1988) and to argue that non-design processes dominate policymaking
(Cohen et al., 1972, 1979). However, this opinion is not universally shared or endorsed (Mucciaroni, 1992). On
the contrary, it is often suggested that most if not all policies are carefully crafted to ensure that policy means
are capable of achieving policy goals in a relatively cost-efﬁcient manner and that exceptions to this rule are rare
and can be eliminated (Packwood, 2002; Kay, 2011).
Some of this disagreement is philosophical in nature (Tribe, 1972; Nelson, 1977; Forester, 1983; Dery, 1984),
but to a very great extent, many of these disagreements are the result of a poor record of empirical studies into the
subjects of policy design and formulation. That is, as Junginger (2013) put it, despite many years of study, we
actually know very little about “the actual activities of designing that bring policies into being—of how people
involved in the creation of policies go about identifying design problems and design criteria, about the methods
they employ in their design process” (p. 3).
This observation is true of policy design in general but is especially acute in the design of social policies, which
are major areas of government spending and action with a long history dating back over several centuries
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). In this sector in particular, there is a strong need to better understand the mechanics
of policy formulation involved in developing policy alternatives in addressing social problems and the extent to
which they are inﬂuenced or follow the rubrics of “design thinking” (Linder and Peters, 1988; Wintges, 2007;
Bason, 2014; Brown and Wyatt, 2010).
In order to address this and other issues related to “good” and “poor” design, the articles in this special issue are
devoted to the careful study of empirical cases of social policy formulation in several jurisdictions and to the
examination of the relationships existing between the design processes followed in each case and the ultimate
success or failure of the policy initiatives examined.
SOCIAL POLICY DESIGN AS A FIELD OF STUDY
Conceptually, an instrumentally oriented policy design process begins with an assessment of the abilities of differ-
ent policy tools to affect policy outputs and outcomes and the kinds of resources required to allow them to operate
as intended (Hood, 1986; Salamon, 2002). As Linder and Peters (1991) noted, this kind of activity is a “spatial” or
contextual one. That is, it is
a systematic activity composed of a series of choices … design solutions, then, will correspond to a set of possible
locations in a design space… this construction emphasizes not only the potential for generating new mixtures of conven-
tional solutions, but also the importance of giving careful attention to tradeoffs among design criteria when considering
instrument choices (p. 130).
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Instrumental knowledge is contextual in the sense that it requires a special understanding of how the use of
speciﬁc kinds of instruments affects target group behavior and compliance with government aims (Weaver,
2009a, 2009b, 2013, 2015). It thus includes knowledge and consideration of many constraints on tool use originat-
ing in the limits of existing knowledge, prevailing governance structures, and other arrangements and behaviors
that may preclude consideration of certain options and promote others (Howlett, 2009a, 2011). It requires both
analytical and evidentiary capacity on the part of the government as well as the intention to exercise it.
In contrast to those scholars who view policymaking as intentional and instrumentally rational, many commen-
tators, pundits, and jaded and cynical members of the public often assume that all policymaking is driven by
politics and hence is more or less irrational and involved in various processes of non-design. However, while it
may not be problem centered, politics-centered design is very much still design, in the instrumental sense of the
term, although its purpose is to advance the interest of powerful stakeholders rather than to solve policy problems.
Indeed, politics has been one of the primary determinants of social policy choices since at least the French
Revolution, as governments increasingly realized that they needed popular support in order to retain ofﬁce (Flora
and Heidenheimer, 1981; Overbye, 1994). Bismarck, for example, established health and pension programs in the
German Empire in the 1870s to undercut growing support for socialist parties among the working class (Rimlinger,
1971) and only secondarily to perfect a solution to the problem of aging and income decline. Similarly, the spread
of democratization further deepened the role of politics in policymaking, especially in the area of social security
(Amenta and Carruthers, 1988; Myles, 1989). Governments throughout the world, from Europe to Latin
America, heightened their social welfare efforts in response to the spread of trade unions and the electoral success
of the political parties afﬁliated with them (Korpi, 1980; Shalev, 1983; Myles, 1989). It is arguable that politics has
always been an integral part, and a primary determinant, of major social policy decisions. This phenomenon has to
be dealt with in any study of social policy design.
There are also, as mentioned previously, situations in which social policy formulation is driven neither by instru-
mental problem solving nor socio-political concerns, a phenomenon and policy formulation space that can be
described as “non-design”. This includes a variety of contexts in which social policy formulators or decision-
makers engage in interest-driven trade-offs or log rolling between different values or resource uses, often in
response to concerns about legislative expediency. In other circumstances, a non-design situation can emerge when
policymakers engage in venal or corrupt behavior in which personal gain from a decision may trump other evalu-
ative and decision-making criteria. Social policy measures that serve symbolic, rather than practical technical or
political, purposes are another example of such non-design. The most pervasive outcome and indicator of such
dynamics, however, are the ﬁne tuning of existing social policy elements and programs simply because they are
a part of a welfare regime and hence are open to manipulation, regardless of their (ir)relevance to contemporary
realities and needs (Bode, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1990).
POLICY DESIGN SPACES AND THEIR IMPACT ON POLICY PROCESSES
Understanding which formulation process is likely to unfold or has unfolded is the key to understanding whether or
not a design process is present and, if so, whether or not it is likely to generate a good or poor design effort.
That is, the design of successful policies requires thinking about policymaking in such a way as to fully take into
account the dual purposes—both technical/problem and political—that polices can serve and the extent to which
efforts to attain those ends are adequately resourced and capable, that is, to understand its “design space” (Hillier
et al., 1972; Hillier and Leaman, 1974; Gero, 1990). As we have seen, a very important aspect of such spaces con-
cerns the general intention of government in enacting policy. Much of the old design literature, as noted previously,
focused attention only upon “technical” analysis, that is, upon efforts to assess the functional potential of speciﬁc
tools (Howlett, 2014). The new design literature keeps this focus but has added to it the need to also assess other
factors, especially political ones.
“Designers” must avoid simply advocating “stock” solutions unless this is called for by the limited nature of the
space available for new designs (May, 1981; Helms et al., 1993). Rather, they should consider the range of feasible
options possible in a given circumstance and package these into sets of competing strategies to achieve policy goals
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(May, 1981: p. 236, 238). Different policy spaces exist depending on how prominent technical and political
concerns are, and these spaces condition what kind of process is followed. As Weimer (1992) has noted,
“instruments, alone or in combination, must be crafted to ﬁt particular substantive, organizational, and political
contexts” (p. 373).
An optimal situation in public policy formulation is one wherein the interests and aims of both politicians and
technical analysts and advisors are congruent and policymakers seek to attain both policy and political objectives
through the same tools. While policymakers both within and outside the government are multi-dimensional crea-
tures with varied needs, political survival is a major concern that leads them to make policies to garner political
support for their election or re-election as well as to solve public problems (Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014). The
health insurance program launched by the Thaksin government in Thailand in 2001 is an example of such a
program: It extended insurance coverage to the entire population while reducing total health expenditures at the
same time as it won the government the subsequent election (Ramesh, 2008).
As Figure 1 shows, other kinds of policy design spaces are also very possible. In those other spaces, either one
or the other goal is missing or contested. As a result, policy processes other than the effective and legitimated ones
found in an optimal design space are likely to emerge.
That is, the nature of the design space that is present as policy formulation occurs has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the kind of policy process likely to unfold and ultimately upon the likelihood that well-crafted policies will emerge
—policies that are effective in the sense of addressing the problem at affordable cost while being both legitimate
and popular with the population and government. Such policies are likely to emerge only when both political
and policy objectives are pursued simultaneously and in tandem.
Pursuit of political objectives unaccompanied by intention to solve a policy problem may be described as
“populist” policymaking that focuses on “valence” issues, which may or may not be susceptible to effective action
(such as ﬁghting crime). Measures that seek to address problems regardless of political implications may be
described as “technocratic” policymaking, which can easily generate politically infeasible options (such as raising
taxes to increase welfare budgets to deal with homelessness). In situations where neither political nor technical
concerns are salient or when policymakers are pressured to adopt contradictory positions because of conﬂicting
political and/or technical demands, policymaking may be paralyzed or result in ineffective or damaging policies.
Figure 1. Policy design spaces and process implications.
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WHY ADOPT A DESIGN THINKING APPROACH TO SOCIAL POLICY?
Policy formulation hence can occupy one or more of several distinct design spaces, from purely instrumental
technical design to purely symbolic non-design. How and when a particular policy can be found in a particular
space and how and when it can move across spaces is a major area of concern in the ﬁeld. For example, aid
agencies and others have long grappled with the question of how a corrupt process of non-design can change to
a more technical problem-centered one (Treisman, 2007; Dahlström et al., 2013).
In general, the effort to understand this question in the social policy realm has suffered as social policy continues
in many circles to be viewed as a “residual” part of public policymaking, disjointed from “mainstream” economic
policies, despite the fact that social policies account for the bulk of public spending in most countries. This attitude
has led social policy design to be viewed by many as simply a political tool molded arbitrarily to serve vested
interests, often to the detriment of public expenditure and social well-being. However, ballooning public expendi-
tures, coupled with budget deﬁcits in many countries and growing public distrust in governments, are making it
imperative for policymakers to approach social policy formulation more systematically. This has led to a
re-consideration of its status and a re-emphasis on understanding the actual practices of policy formulation
followed in this sector.
Social problems have become a more clear and present challenge in both developed and developing countries.
Volatile economies, rising inequality, changing demographics, humanitarian crises, and changing environmental
conditions are posing new challenges and creating complex social problems (Yi, 2015). Further, countries around
the world are becoming more problem centered and aware and are demanding effective solutions to social problems
and injustices (Brezinski, 2005), forcing governments to improve their policy performance.
This increasing complexity of social problems and concerns has led many governments to attempt to adopt a
more systematic and integrated approach to social policy rather than the bandaid approach of incremental changes
or the siloed policy patchwork that existed in the past. For example, social problems such as elderly care require
coordination between the health sector, labor market, and the pension system, among others. Such an integrated
design approach, with a systematic mixing of policy instruments rather than ad hoc layering, is more likely to result
in optimal outcomes.
Further, governments may need to creatively craft social policies to address the multi-faceted issues they now
face. An example of such design thinking might be a design orientation that consciously targets equity as well
as efﬁciency through consumption and behavioral changes (Brown and Wyatt, 2010). This may require a tool that
intermeshes social policy and social regulation. While regulation has been a traditional policy instrument for
addressing market failures, it is of little use when addressing failures in providing social goods such as education,
health care, and housing (Wu and Ramesh, 2014). However, to address equity and efﬁciency in the provision of
social goods, it may be necessary to undertake social regulation design that would impose certain choices on
consumers, especially where governments believe that the consumption is sub-optimal.
With increasing political awareness, the knowledge aspect of design is also gaining signiﬁcance in the social
policy arena. Governments are increasingly expected to crowdsource inputs and use evidence from the govern-
ment, the public, and experts, especially where citizens have a direct stake in formulating policy (Garcia Martinez,
2015; Linders, 2012). As citizens get more informed and demand better governance, these capabilities may quickly
become the norm.
CAPACITY ISSUES IN POLICY DESIGN: UNDERSTANDING DESIGN DYNAMICS
Transforming intentions into practice is a complex process, and many noble efforts of policymakers fail because of
lack of capacity for designing effective policies. Policy design—in the social policy sphere and all others—is most
productive when the government enjoys legitimacy and broad political support. Design will be strong or weak
depending on the organizational and analytical competences that governments possess to formulate and implement
their policy preferences.
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This suggests that within the current setting of changing social problems, political expectations, and policy
technologies, balancing political and technical objectives is only part of the policy design challenge. A second
enabling condition is required for effective social policy designs to emerge from policy formulation activity: the
policy capacity to allow a government to acquire and process the information and knowledge required to conduct
a sophisticated policy analysis of problems and alternatives. This second factor—policy capacity—is the one that
determines whether or not the process ultimately generates a strong or a weak design.
Conducive design spaces are a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for effective design to occur. Governments
must have more than just the room or space to engage in policy design; they must also have the capability to do so
in an effective way on the ground.
Policy capacity in this sense refers to the governance and organization-analytical capacity of the government
(Wu et al., 2015; Howlett and Ramesh, 2015): the sets of skills, competences, resources, and institutional arrange-
ments and capabilities with which key tasks and functions in the policy process are structured, staffed, and
supported.
In order to design effective policies, governments need to enjoy or create the conditions necessary for their
formulation. While there are many types of policy capabilities, broadly speaking, it is the relevant agencies’
analytical capacity and the system-wide political and managerial capacity that shape policymakers’ capacity to
set and achieve policy goals (Wu et al., 2015).
The extent to which the actors involved in the policy process are able to carry out their functions depends on an
agency’s data collection and analysis capabilities; storage and dissemination of operational information such as
client needs, service utilization, budget and human resources; and, increasingly, e-government infrastructure and
access to policy advisory services in and out of government. Intra-agency and inter-agency cooperation and
coordination also affect the analytical capacity of governments.
A government’s policy formulation capacity is also crucially affected by system-wide political capabilities
evident in the level of support and trust a public agency enjoys from its political masters and from the society at
large, as well as the nature of the economic and security systems within which policymakers operate (Woo
et al., 2015). Political trust is vital because agencies and managers must be considered legitimate in order to access
resources from their authorizing institutions and constituencies on a continuing basis. To be able to deﬁne goals
and choose the best instrument for the job, the concerned policymakers and their respective agencies need to enjoy
the trust of their target population as well as other relevant agencies within the government. Without this trust and
legitimacy, policymakers will lack the information necessary to devise effective policies and, more importantly,
carry them out.
Figure 2. Capacity issues in policy design outcomes.
9EFFECTIVE SOCIAL POLICY DESIGN
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 37, 3–14 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/pad
Agencies’ analytical competences allow the members involved in the policy process to identify and understand
policy problems, canvass for solutions, assess alternatives based on comparative assessment, and evaluate the
impacts of chosen policies (Howlett, 2009, 2015). The latter two dimensions can be termed a government’s
“governance capacity” as they relate to and determine the state’s ability to affect and alter its own and social
behavior towards its own ends.
Figure 2 suggests that within each of the design spaces set out in Figure 1, four possibilities exist. Even in an
optimal design situation, effective policies can emerge only if governments possess high levels of governance
capacity as well as a high level of analytical capability. Conversely, the absence of both types of capabilities allows
only for weak design efforts and increases the probability of ineffective policies emerging from this process.
CAPACITY ISSUES IN SOCIAL POLICY DESIGN
Awareness of this second area of concern relating to policy capacity has been less manifested in scholarship on
social policy, which has largely evaded discussions on the difﬁculties involved in making social policy. To the
extent that social policy research does address practical policy issues, it has typically focussed on assessing the
nature and magnitude of social problems (in the social work or economics domains), assessing implementation
experiences (a public administration domain), or analyzing the political and institutional determinants of policy
choices and outcomes (a political science domain). It is time for social policy scholars to begin to focus on policy
design issues in order to better understand what policymakers should and can do in which circumstances.
Social problems are typically multi-faceted and intertwined; rooted in a diverse range of individual, social and
economic conditions, and ideological and religious predilections; and often highly politicized. This places great
demands on governments. Successful policy design in such environments requires a high level of policy capacity
that may not exist, for example, the construction of bundles or packages of tools over time that attempt to simul-
taneously address multiple goals in overlapping and multi-level and multi-sector contexts (Bode, 2006;
Esping-Andersen, 1990). Poverty alleviation, for instance, requires different programs for different types of
poverty and its varied underlying causes: conditional and unconditional cash transfers, tax assistance for those in
marginal employment, labor training, and so on.
Moreover, social policies often deal with more intractable problems in the context of poor knowledge of causal
relations and poorly funded and resource-poor organizations, while the solutions proposed touch on deeply held
normative and ideological or religious values and beliefs that inhibit formulation and implementation efforts at
the systemic level. Popular perception, and not just substance, is more important for social policy than for many
other policy areas because social policies touch on substantial portions of the population—either because individ-
uals have to pay for the costs of such policies in their taxes or because they receive beneﬁts, or both.
For those favoring more problem-focused technocratic policies, the worst situation is a politicized, religious, or
ideologically driven policy process, employed by low-capacity policymakers for short-term legislative or other pur-
poses regardless of its impact on the problem at hand. More common is the politicized space where high-capacity
politicians make spending commitments for electoral gains, while more effective solutions are ignored. In other
situations, a positive design space exists, and policymakers’ analytical and organizational capacities are high
enough to allow them to undertake complex problem-solving tasks. In yet other instances, the same kind of space
may exist, but policymakers lack the political trust and legitimacy with key stakeholders and the population at large
to undertake technically effective or efﬁcient solutions; as a result, they make technocratic choices that fail to
achieve their full potential. In addition, the operations and effectiveness of the tools are affected by surrounding
social, political, and economic conditions. As we have seen, a weak policy space undermines an intentional policy
design orientation. In combination with weak capacity, this can drive design efforts into the bottom right quadrant
of Figure 1, resulting in poor design.
The capacity constraints may be so strong that the ultimate design of social policies is only distantly related to
solving the originally highlighted problem. When policy tools are used in combination, as is often the case in social
policy, or when they are layered on top of earlier tools, for example, there are additional complexities that promote
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synergies and complementarities but also allow for contradictions and conﬂicts in expected and unexpected ways.
Only a high level of policy capacity can predict and avoid these situations (Howlett and Rayner, 2007).
CONCLUSION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE
Solving difﬁcult social problems has meant that social policymaking needs to continually evolve and innovate in
order to address new and older problems in changing circumstances. But while having a design orientation is useful
in this regard, it is difﬁcult if not impossible to design in a poor design space or when governments lack requisite
competences and capabilities and hence the capacity to design effectively. Successful design will require a shift
from a poor political non-design space to one more favorable to successful action; in many cases, this also requires
an improvement in policy capacity that may not be forthcoming.
Capacity improvements are thus a sine qua non for many improvements in social policy formulation. This is
because design in complex multi-actor multi-level situations requires more than just an understanding of the prob-
lem at hand, the features of the tools relevant to addressing them, and how they operate when used individually and
in combination with other tools. It also requires the organizational and systemic resources and support that allow
those individual-level skills and competences to be exercised.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many approaches to social policy reform around the globe focus on building
capacity for better policy design through decentralization and the creation of closer operational links between
national and sub-national or regional and sub-regional actors. As Figure 1 has shown, however, this in itself is
not enough if a government wishes to alter existing practices in a more systematic and instrumental fashion. Such
a shift also requires the adoption of a design orientation towards social policymaking, moving the formulation
space towards the upper two quadrants.
This special issue addresses the differences between more, and less, problem-centered policy formulation and
decision processes and the likelihood and reasons for each occurring, both in general and a social policy context.
By undertaking a discussion of the intention to engage in policy design, the special issue develops and applies
various models of formulation processes and policy design spaces in speciﬁc cases selected by the authors. These
cases help assess the nature of the formulation processes that can exist between ideal instrumental and problem–
solution-driven policy design and other more political and less intentional processes. They demonstrate the inte-
grated nature of social policy design that engages multiple levels of public administration and spans across multiple
sectors. The articles in the issue explore each of these issues in detail, bridging the gap between policy theory and
social policy practice.
The articles in this special issue are organized into three sections. The ﬁrst two papers, which examine social
enterprise policy in South Korea and the contracting out of social services in China, reveal that good policy design
alone is not enough to ensure effectiveness, especially in the longer term. They emphasize the role of non-state
actors in effective social policy design. In their article, M. Jae Moon and TaeHyung Kim examine how Korea’s
Social Enterprise Promotion Act of 2007 affects these enterprises’ social and economic performance. The authors
conclude that although the policy design positively affects social performance, its long-term effectiveness depends
not just on good policy but on a more mature civil society.
Wen Zhuoyi’s contribution looks at the policy intent of contracting out social services in China and studies two
local experiments with contracting out in Guangdong province that present different models of design thinking and
focus. While the experiments in Guangdong and Shenzhen increased the number of social organizations and are
considered to be successful, they also reveal a number of problems with contracting out, including insufﬁcient
competition, the potential for collusion, and de-professionalization of social work—difﬁculties that are particularly
acute in the context of China’s emerging welfare state.
The next contribution focuses on the dynamics of policy design with an emphasis on balancing multi-sector
objectives. Namrata Chindarkar’s study of Gujarat, India’s rural electriﬁcation policy argues that the design and
implementation of the policy were as much problem driven as it was politically motivated. A top-down,
outcome-based approach enabled Gujarat’s scheme to be implemented in record time and within available means.
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It also illustrates how rural development, infrastructure, and agricultural policies are closely integrated and require
a careful design approach.
The ﬁnal two papers complement the multi-sector policy design approach and tackle efforts to improve policy
design through the lens of health policy and urban–rural integration in China. Azad Singh Bali and M. Ramesh
develop a schema of regulatory, ﬁscal, informational, and organizational tools that can be employed to achieve
effective health care. The paper highlights the use, misuse, and non-use of these speciﬁc tools in China from the
1970s to the present to shed light on viable health policy reforms.
Qian Jiwei’s contribution looks at China’s efforts to equalize access to public services between urban and rural
residents. An urban–rural integration pilot program undertaken in Chongqing was especially successful in relieving
ﬁscal constraints, and some of the policies in the Chongqing pilot have subsequently been taken up by the central
government. Despite the successes, the policy faces a number of institutional constraints. Further study will be
required to determine whether and how such a policy can be successfully transferred to other areas of China.
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